US faces difficulty securing Iran’s enriched uranium stockpile as conflict goals shift

Since the joint military action carried out by the United States and Israel against Iran on February 28, the objectives surrounding the conflict have evolved several times. Early narratives included the possibility of regime change in Iran, preventive action to stop a potential strike against Israel, limiting Iran’s regional influence, and ensuring stability for shipping routes passing through the Strait of Hormuz. Despite these changing priorities, Washington has maintained one constant position — preventing Iran from gaining the capability to produce nuclear weapons.

Former U.S. President Donald Trump reiterated this stance during a speech announcing the operation, stressing that Iran must never obtain nuclear weapons. Similar remarks were repeated in several statements made before and after the strike, showing that dismantling Iran’s nuclear potential remains a central objective. Current intelligence assessments suggest Iran holds roughly 440 kilograms of uranium enriched to 60 percent, a quantity experts believe could be sufficient to produce around ten nuclear devices if further refined.

As the conflict moves into its third week, however, the United States has not yet managed to capture, secure, or destroy any portion of Iran’s enriched uranium reserves. Discussions have surfaced about deploying special operations forces or limited ground units, yet military planners acknowledge that such an operation would be extremely complicated and risky.

One of the primary obstacles is the location of the uranium itself. Much of Iran’s highly enriched material is believed to be stored deep underground in reinforced facilities, making it extremely difficult to reach using airstrikes or conventional weapons. These storage points are also spread across multiple sites, meaning that even precise bombing would not necessarily eliminate the material. Instead, the impact could scatter radioactive particles, creating contamination similar to what is known as a dirty bomb effect. In addition, removing nuclear knowledge is far more difficult than destroying physical equipment, since trained scientists cannot simply be eliminated through military action.

According to the most recent estimate released by the International Atomic Energy Agency, Iran possessed approximately 440 kilograms of uranium enriched to 60 percent as of last year. Technically, increasing enrichment from 60 percent to weapons-grade 90 percent can be done relatively quickly. The agency has previously noted that about 42 kilograms of 60-percent enriched uranium could be processed into enough weapons-grade material for one nuclear bomb.

Comments from U.S. officials have also highlighted the scale of the challenge. Middle East envoy Steve Witkoff stated in an interview that Iranian representatives themselves acknowledged holding enough enriched uranium to potentially produce multiple nuclear weapons. In addition to the 60-percent stockpile, Iran is believed to maintain thousands of kilograms enriched to lower levels, including 20 percent and below.

Reports indicate that the highest-grade uranium is likely stored in underground complexes near Isfahan and Natanz, both of which were targeted during a previous U.S. strike known as Operation Midnight Hammer. Iranian authorities claim the material remains buried under debris following the attack, while intelligence sources suggest some portions may have been relocated before the strikes occurred.

So far, U.S. forces have avoided direct bombing of confirmed uranium storage areas, partly due to the risk of radioactive contamination and the difficulty of safely recovering the material afterward. During a congressional briefing, U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio stated that at some stage personnel would need to physically enter the facilities to secure the uranium, because airstrikes alone cannot safely neutralize nuclear material. Such a mission would require not only special forces but also technical experts capable of handling radioactive substances.

Elite American units such as Delta Force and SEAL Team Six regularly train for scenarios involving weapons of mass destruction, yet even for them the scale of this task would be unprecedented. Israel has carried out similar but smaller operations in the past, including a raid on an underground missile facility in Syria, where explosives had to be placed manually after aerial strikes proved ineffective.

Security analysts warn that any attempt to seize Iran’s uranium could become one of the most complex special operations missions ever attempted. Former National Security Council official Richard Nephew noted that securing a single nuclear site could require around one thousand troops, along with additional forces for protection, transport, and technical support.

Past operations show how large such missions can become. When U.S. forces captured Venezuelan leader Nicolás Maduro earlier this year, dozens of special operators were supported by thousands of troops and extensive air cover. Handling nuclear material would demand even more planning, equipment, and personnel.

Transporting the uranium itself also presents major challenges. Although the material may weigh only a few hundred kilograms, safe storage containers, shielding equipment, and transport systems would make the load far heavier and more difficult to move. One possible method would be to dilute the enriched uranium on site, but this requires industrial-scale machinery and time, both of which may be unavailable during active conflict. Destroying the material with explosives is not considered safe, because the blast would likely spread radioactive particles into the environment instead of eliminating them.

Because of these risks, nuclear disarmament efforts normally involve dismantling or chemically reducing materials rather than detonating them. This reality explains why the United States has so far avoided direct attempts to seize Iran’s stockpile despite repeated statements that preventing nuclear weapons development remains a priority.

During a recent radio interview, Trump acknowledged that there is currently no immediate plan to secure the enriched uranium, noting that military efforts are focused instead on neutralizing drones and missile systems. His remarks suggest that the danger of deploying large ground forces inside Iran is still viewed as too high compared with the potential benefits, leaving the issue of Iran’s uranium stockpile unresolved for now.