Iran Allegedly Monitored U.S. Force Movements Before Deadly Attack in Kuwait, Army Document Indicates

In the days leading up to an Iranian retaliatory assault that resulted in the deaths of six American service personnel in Kuwait, it appears Iran may have closely monitored U.S. troops as they shifted locations outside official bases under Washington’s protective strategy, according to a U.S. Army memo.

The fatalities occurred in early March as the U.S. and Israel engaged in heightened military tensions with Iran. The memo from U.S. Army Central, a major branch of U.S. Central Command, suggests that Iranian‑aligned militia forces probably utilized a combination of intelligence methods to observe the withdrawal of some American forces from fixed military sites.

Indications of Drone Activity and Reconnaissance

Multiple U.S. military officials, speaking anonymously — because they were not authorized to comment publicly — reported sightings of small quad‑copter drones operating around Shuaiba port in Kuwait. These drones were believed to be conducting reconnaissance prior to the drone strike that ultimately caused multiple U.S. casualties.

After the strike on March 1, U.S. forces reportedly discovered GPS transponders attached to balloons or parachutes near Patriot Missile Defense Systems. At this point, the purpose of these devices — and whether they were connected to the Iranian drones — remains unclear.

When asked for clarification, U.S. Army Central directed questions to U.S. Central Command, which did not respond to requests for comment.

Pentagon Briefs Media on Operation Epic Fury

At a joint press briefing held at the Pentagon, U.S. Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth and Gen. Dan Caine, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, discussed the U.S. military’s response to Iran, dubbed Operation Epic Fury.

Hegseth emphasized that the Defense Department’s foremost priority before initiating offensive combat operations was safeguarding U.S. service members. He explained that as combat forces were readied, the majority of American troops were moved out of harm’s way, referred to as the “get off the X” initiative.

What “Get Off the X” Signifies

In military terminology, “X” refers to a target area. “Getting off the X” means relocating personnel away from positions that could be targeted or attacked. According to Pentagon officials, this plan placed most U.S. troops out of range of Iranian weaponry.

Tragically, the tactical operations center at Shuaiba port remained a hub of activity under this strategy and became the site where six Americans lost their lives. One senior U.S. military official noted that although the relocation plan made sense, some service members inadvertently remained in harm’s way because the threat zone shifted — essentially moving the “X” with them.

The Role of the Shuaiba Tactical Operations Center

According to three U.S. military sources who spoke with CBS News, the facility at Shuaiba port functioned as a Continuity of Operations Tactical Operations Center (COOP TOC) — a backup command post meant to take over if a primary site becomes compromised.

While the building structure had served logistical purposes for years, it was repurposed for the Defense Department’s Iranian offensive. This approach mirrored procedures previously employed in earlier conflicts, such as the 12‑day escalation between Israel and Iran.

The COOP TOC was fortified with T‑walls — reinforced structures designed to shield against indirect fire like mortars or rockets but exceptionally limited against aerial attacks like drones.

Despite CBS News reporting to the contrary, Pentagon spokesperson Sean Parnell maintained the center was a secure, fortified facility with six‑foot protective barriers.

Warnings, Air Defenses, and Drone Threats

On the day of the attack, some U.S. service members recalled discussions about the suitability of using Shuaiba port as a secondary operations center, arguing that consolidating troops in an open location without robust defense against aerial threats increased vulnerability.

Ground leaders reportedly ignored these warnings. Military personnel also stated that the base’s aerial warning siren had functioned throughout the week leading up to the strike. Yet in previous drone incidents, several drones entered U.S. installations before the siren sounded. Some service members were unsure if the alert activated in time during the deadly attack.

Requests for additional Counter‑Unmanned Aircraft Systems (C‑UAS) to defend against incoming drones reportedly went unfulfilled. One official told CBS News that “the port had no drone defeat capability.”

Although Kuwait possessed interceptor systems nearby, it is still unclear whether these were deployed during the strike.

“You have defensive systems engaging threats, but occasionally one slips through,” Hegseth stated at the Pentagon. “Unfortunately, in this incident, it struck a fortified tactical operations center. These are powerful weapons.”

Identification of the Fallen and Expanded Defense Efforts

The Pentagon later released the names of those killed:

• Maj. Jeffrey R. O’Brien
• Capt. Cody Khork
• Sgt. 1st Class Noah Tietjens
• Sgt. 1st Class Nicole Amor
• Sgt. Declan Coady (posthumously promoted)
  Additionally, Chief Warrant Officer 3 Robert M. Marzan is believed to be the sixth soldier who died. All six were part of the 103rd Sustainment Command based in Des Moines.

Since the start of the Russia‑Ukraine war, the Defense Department has examined ways to strengthen military positions and counter drone threats more effectively. Part of this initiative includes the formation of the Joint Interagency Task Force 401, aimed at rapidly improving Pentagon counter‑drone capabilities.

In January, the task force released a comprehensive playbook for military leaders responsible for securing installations against drone incursions. Recommendations include deploying protective netting to intercept or pre‑detonate incoming drones and reinforcing overhead sheltering.

Army Brig. Gen. Matt Ross, director of the task force, emphasized that whether the target is a forward operating base, an outdoor event venue, or a major international stadium, the same principles for physical protection and risk assessment apply.